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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
ADRIAN VERMEULE*
It's an appropriate time to consider the legacy of judicial review.
Only rarely do deeply entrenched doctrines and practices like
judicial review become plausible candidates for rethinking. Yet two
contradictory trends have restored this basic question to the
intellectual agenda. On the one hand, judicial review has gained
new vigor in European legal systems,1 and the Rehnquist Court is
currently in an aggressive phase.2 On the other hand, prominent
Americanjurists such as Mike Klarman, Richard Posner, and Mark
Tushnet, and including Jeremy Waldron as an honorary American,
have recently questioned judicial review root-and-branch-a
significant development given that even ten years ago a
thoroughgoing opposition to judicial review was the mark of a
crank. Judicial review is making gains abroad while losing a
measure of intellectual respectability at home.
Is judicial review desirable? I shall supply a three-part answer to
that question. First, normative analysis of judicial review is
necessarily a consequentialist exercise in institutional choice. The
question we'd like to answer is whether paramount authority to
interpret the Constitution should be lodged in the judiciary or in the
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This is a version of remarks delivered at
a symposium on the Legacy of John Marshall, held by the Institute of Bill of Rights Law of
the College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. Thanks to Michael
Gerhardt, Jack Goldsmith, David Strauss, and the symposium participants for helpful
comments, to Trish Hillier for excellent research assistance, and to the Russell J. Parsons
Faculty Research Fund for its support. Special thanks to Yun Soo Vermeule.
1. BojanBugaric, Courts asPolicy-Makers:Lessonsfrom Transition, 42 HAR.INTLL.J.
247, 250-51 (2001).
2. Dahlia Lithwick, The High Court's Eating Disorder, SLATE, July 3, 2001, at
http://slate.msn.com/default.aspx?id=111437.
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 15-27 (2001); MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS passim (1999); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW
AND DISAGREEMENT passim (1999); Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About
Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145 (1998).
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lawmaking process.4  Nonconsequentialist commitments, for
example a commitment to "democracy," usually prove too abstract
to cut between institutional options of this sort. Second, however,
institutional-choice questions of this magnitude are excessively
information-demanding. The information necessary to make the
assessment is unobtainable, or at best excessively costly to obtain;
the scale of the questions is too large; the interaction between
institutions is too dynamic and complex; and the possibility of
unintended consequences from any choice of institutional ar-
rangement is too great.
Third, the combination of the first two points creates the
dilemma of institutional choice: we can't assess judicial review
without answering questions that we lack the information to
answer. The upshot is that, as I've argued elsewhere, institutional
choice over questions of this magnitude must inevitably fall back
upon a weak repertoire of techniques for practical reasoning under
conditions of profound uncertainty.' I will apply some of those
techniques to the question of judicial review, but they butt up
against the region where consequentialism runs out of steam. In
that region large-scale institutional reforms like abolishing judicial
review require a leap of faith, and I'll conclude with a bit of positive
theorizing about what causes us to take such leaps on the
infrequent occasions that we do so.
Start by assuming that we can costlessly obtain full information
about the determinants of the institutional-choice question.
Because we need some fixed starting points from which to reason,
I will assume that the only issue at stake is whether Marbury v.
Madison6 should be overruled, leaving in place all other
constitutional provisions and doctrines that regulate relations
between the judiciary and other branches of government. For
4. A distinct question is whether the judiciary's interpretive authority, even ifsupreme,
should or should not be exclusive. See Larry D. Kramer, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1,
13 (2001) (arguing that supremacy does not entail exclusivity).
5. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 113-28 (2000).
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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expository clarity I'll exclude intermediate institutional forms like
Robert Bork's proposal that Congress be empowered to override
constitutional decisions by a majority vote of each House. 7 I will
assume that the only options under consideration are full judicial
supremacy, on the one hand, and political-branch supremacy, on
the other. Now this procedure is mildly unrealistic-obviously
various doctrines of standingjusticiability, and deference moderate
the current regime-but it helps to isolate the relevant consid-
erations.
With full information, the principal determinants of the
institutional choice question are the agency costs of judicial
review, its moral hazard effects, the optimal rate of legal change,
and the transition costs of switching from a Marbury regime to a
political-supremacy regime. Each of these considerations, however,
implicates a tangle of subsidiary questions, and I hope it will
become clear that the information needed for fully specified
institutional choice far exceeds our present intellectual resources.
AGENCY COSTS
Hamilton's defense of judicial review in The Federalist No. 78
supposes a simple principal/agent model with multiple agents: the
people, as principal, appoint legislative representatives subject to
the terms of the agency agreement (the Constitution), and also
appoint the judiciary as another agent to enforce the agreement.' If
the judges were both infallible and perfectly faithful, the Hamilton
model would be persuasive; whether it is actually persuasive
depends on the relative agency costs of judicial review and
legislative action.
Agency costs come in two forms, agent incompetence and agent
self-dealing. The competence issue is whether faithful agents suffer
informational and cognitive constraints that cause them to make
mistakes, defining "mistake" according to the observer's preferred
substantive theory of constitutional interpretation. Faithful but
7. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERIcAN DECLINE 117-18 (1996).
8. THEFEDERALISTNO. 78, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
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fallible judges will issue erroneous rulings of constitutionality and
of unconstitutionality, and both weigh against judicial review:
excessively lax review suggests that judicial review is unnecessary,
while excessively stringent review suggests that it is afirmatively
harmful. Nor can we optimistically suppose that random errors in
either direction will wash out; even if that is so, we also care about
the constitutional variance produced by our institutional choices. A
judiciary that made a precisely equal number of errors in either
direction would be far worse than one that made no errors at all.
The self-dealing issue is whether epistemically perfect agents will
use their authority to divert gains to themselves; here too the
consequence will be erroneous constitutional decisions by the
judges, although caused by self-interest rather than incompetence.
This is a touchy subject for constitutional law professors, because
we like to maintain civil relations with the judges, but consider
whether it is plausible that self-interest distorts judicial review of
statutes that alter judicial compensation, as in United States v.
Will;9 or review of statutes that the Justices lobbied against in the
legislative process, as in United States v. Morrison; or review of
electoral outcomes that will determine the identity of the Justices'
colleague~s, as in Bush v. Gore." The latter two cases might also be
described as examples of vanity rather than self-interest, and all of
the cases emphasize that the distinction between incompetence and
self-interest is fuzzy, for cognitive mechanisms such as motivated
reasoning and the self-serving bias may transmute self-interest into
"sincere" error.
It goes without saying that we can't restrict our attention to the
agency costs inflicted by imperfect judiciaries. We need to compare
the net agency costs of fallible legislatures and fallible courts under
the two alternative institutional schemes of judicial and political
supremacy. With or withoutMarbury-style review, legislatures may
erroneously reject bills on constitutional grounds or erroneously fail
9. 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
10. 529 U.S. 598(2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)); see also
Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article
III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1005 n.322 (2000) (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist and the
Federal Judicial Conference lobbied against VAWA before its enactment).
11. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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to do so. Marbury-style review adds the possibility that in-
sufficiently vigorous constitutional review by legislatures will be
corrected, but also adds the possibility that erroneous judicial
invalidations will combine with erroneous legislative rejections to
produce dramatic overenforcement of constitutional rules.
MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS
A further complication is the possibility of dynamic interaction
effects between legislative and judicial determinations of consti-
tutionality. One possibility is moral hazard: if judicial review is a
constitutional insurance policy against erroneous legislative
determinations, it may dilute rather than strengthen legislators'
incentives to take precautions against erroneous enactment of
unconstitutional statutes. This is Thayer's concern that judicial
review would dilute the statesman's sense of constitutional
responsibility."2 The concern is parasitic on the assumption that
judges are fallible: if judicial review catches all and only those
unconstitutional statutes that responsible legislators would catch
anyway in a regime without judicial review, then the moral hazard
effect doesn't change any outcomes. But ifjudges are. fallible, then
moral hazard may act as a multiplier, causing a net increase in the
number of constitutionally objectionable statutes that survive both
legislative and judicial scrutiny.
OPTIMAL RATE OF LEGAL CHANGE
So far I have assumed that judicial review "invalidates" statutes,
which is legally accurate but ignores the common view that the
practical effect of review is merely to delay a statute's effectiveness
until the process of presidential appointment aligns the Court's
holdings with the nation's wishes. 3 That view makes strong
assumptions. If the delay is a generation or so, as it was with the
12. JAMES B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 107 (1901).
13. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHrIE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 197-200 (1988) (describing the Realist argument that in the medium-
to-long run judicial review doesn't matter very much" because of political controls, the most
important being the appointment of new Supreme Court justices).
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child labor laws, then the difference between invalidation and delay
has no cash value to anyone alive at the time of the initial decision.
The Court's erroneous ruling may itself generate new interest
groups and social movements that will subsequently immunize the
ruling from reversal, which is one account of the aftermath of Roe
v. Wade.'4 But even on its own terms, the delay point just changes
the institutional-choice question from one about comparative
agency costs and moral hazard to one about the optimal rate of legal
change. We'd need to know whether delay, as measured from the
no-judicial-review baseline, moves us closer to or farther from the
optimal point.
It's quite possible that the answer is "farther from." Madison was
intensely concerned with slowing the rate of legal change, which he
saw as excessive because of the "inconstancy" and "mutability" of
legislative lawmaking, 5 but he said very little about judicial review;
he sought to build in the necessary delay through bicameralism,
small legislatures, and long legislative terms." Adding judge-
created delay to those structural features is very possibly excessive.
TRANSITION COSTS
A final consideration is that the question whether we should
abolish judicial review is not the same as the question whether we'd
want to institute it if we didn't already have it. The status quo
position matters. The opponents ofjudicial review that I mentioned
earlier elide this distinction, in Waldron's case because his basic
concern is to prevent the introduction of judicial review into the
British legal system."7 This concern about the costs of transition to
a regime of legislative supremacy interacts with the other
considerations that I've mentioned. Thayer's moral-hazard concern
that judicial review debases legislative responsibility, 8 for example,
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see, e.g., Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and
Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 95-96 (1998) (stating that social forces played a
defining role in the Court's later refusal to overrule Roe).
15. THE FEDERALIsT No. 62, at 410-12 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
16. Id. at 409-10.
17. WALDRON, supra note 3, at 211-14.
18. THAYER, supra note 12, at 107.
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suggests that a sudden switch from a regime of vigorous judicial
review to one of legislative supremacy might prove disastrous.
Legislators made constitutionally irresponsible by the previous
regime could hardly adjust instantly to their new obligations, and
if the moral hazard effect dissipated very slowly, the interim period
might pose a real risk of legislative oppression. Even if the new
long-term equilibrium were better than the old judicial-review
equilibrium, the transitional disruption might prove so severe as to
block any path from the latter to the former. In that case, the
current regime ofjudicial review would constitute a local-maximum
trap, akin to the problem facing subsistence farmers who are unable
to switch to more productive technologies because they will starve
to death in the meantime.
It should be clear that the number and scope of the variables we'd
need to consider, in a fully specified institutional-choice analysis of
judicial review, is staggering. It's not feasible to acquire the
necessary information, at least at any reasonable cost within the
short or medium term. To be sure, comparative work on judicial
review in the political science literature has outlined some of the
relevant variables, 9 but it has not made much progress on
specifying their magnitudes. Further, the complexity of social and
political systems means that it's almost always possible to dispute
a comparative analogy by pointing to an omitted factor-some
plausibly relevant difference between the United States and the
comparison country. What we can get out of comparative work are
large-scale truths that verge on banalities, such as the truth that
the absence of judicial review need not produce majoritarian
tyranny, and a healthy exposure to the full variety of judicial-
review arrangements. 0 The latter sort of information, however,
adds options to the menu of institutional choice and thus makes the
problem more, rather than less, information-demanding.
19. See, e.g., JUDIcIALINDEPENDENcEINTHEAGEOFDEMOCRAcY: CRITIcALPERSPECTIvES
FROM AROUND UE WORLD (Peter H. Russell & David M. O'Brien eds., 2001).
20. See, e.g., id.
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If the desirability of judicial review is an institutional-choice
question, but an intractable one (at least on the current state of
political science and legal theory, and probably for the foreseeable
future as well), what conclusion should we reach? One reaction is
to abandon consequentialist analysis altogether. If the complexity
of "global net long-term equilibrium effects" makes institutional
choice indeterminate, we ought on this view to choose institutions
that comport with whatever nonconsequentialist theory of justice
or theory of the good that we happen to hold.2 Those theories,
however, will in most settings prove too abstract to cut between the
choices available to us at the level of constitutional design. A
commitment to democracy, for example, is compatible with judicial
supremacy if we jigger the institutional variables the right way;22
that's the lesson of Hamilton's resolute discounting of the agency
costs of judicial review in The Federalist No. 78.2"
The only other recourse is to invoke an eclectic group of tools for
practical reasoning under conditions of profound uncertainty, tools
found in decision theory, rhetoric, and other disciplines. Some are
spurious, for example the use of burdens of proof-a device that
courts properly use to reduce decision costs and to allocate the risk
of error in the face of uncertainty,2 ' but that academics usually use
as a rhetorical device to close down an argument. So when Judge
Posner says that Waldron and the other skeptics have not proved
that judicial review is a bad idea,' we're entitled to ask whether
Judge Posner has proved that it's a good one.
A better technique is based on the principle of insufficient reason.
It instructs the decision maker to count only known costs,
eliminating other unknown and unknowable costs from both sides
of the ledger by assuming they will wash out. This sort of reasoning,
21. See Jon Elster, Arguments for Constitutional Choice, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 307-16 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
22. See FRANKI. MICHELMAN, BRENNANAND DEMOCRACY 19 (1999) (attributing this claim
to Ronald Dworkin).
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 489-96 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
24. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 363-79 (describing the use of burdens of proof in an
adversarial judicial system).
25. See, e.g., id. at 27 (stating that skeptics have not proved their case against judicial
review).
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like a burden-of-proof rule, may end up incorporating the status quo
into the analysis, but it does so on more respectable grounds. If
the costs of transition from one institutional arrangement to
another, for example, are clearly positive, and the other variables
on both sides are imponderable, this approach counsels against
disrupting the status quo in the search for speculative gains. A
sophisticated defense of judicial review along these lines is David
Strauss' position: "[Olur acceptance of [judicial review] outruns
our belief that it is theoretically best .... One reason is that it
works well enough, and it would be too costly and risky to reopen
the question whether, abstractly considered, it is the best possible
arrangement."26
Here, I think, consequentialism runs out of raw material.
Strauss' position rejects the search for optimal institutions in favor
of a satisficing approach, in which everything hinges on how the
aspiration level is or should be set-what it means for a given
institutional arrangement to work"well enough."" This just means
that when the variables relevant to institutional choice proliferate
faster than our information and computational capacities, as is
frequently the case when fundamental reforms like the abolition of
judicial review are at issue, change will occur when the costs of the
status quo come to seem intolerable and when those costs are
incurred in a particularly salient fashion.
In such circumstances we have sometimes rejected longstanding
institutional arrangements, despite our inability to predict the
consequences of the change. Consider the Court's decision in Erie"8
to overturn the Swift v. Tyson 29 regime, in part because of a
consequentialist concern for vertical forum-shopping between
federal and state courts. 0 The optimizer may protest that the
switch to the Erie position may simply replace vertical forum-
shopping with horizontal forum-shopping; the satisficer may say, a
lh Strauss, that the definite cost of transition from one regime to
the other should dominate the speculative possibility that the new
26. DavidA. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHu. L. REV. 877,
913-14 (1996).
27. Id. at 913-16.
28. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80.
30. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-77.
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regime will minimize litigants' strategic behavior. By the time of
Erie, however, there were highly salient examples of the costs of the
Swift v. Tyson regime-Black & White Taxi"' is the most famous
case-and to many people it didn't in fact seem that the existing
regime was working "well enough."32 The Justices were willing to
take an institutional leap of faith, one that consequentialism could
neither endorse nor refute.
If this picture is right, however, judicial review is probably secure
for now. To provoke legal elites into taking a leap of faith to a
regime of legislative supremacy, a leap even longer than that
involved in Erie, would require something like a string of highly
salient judicial blunders akin to Dred Scott3 or Hammer v.
Dagenhart,34 coinciding with an energized national majority in firm
control of the national political branches and of the statehouses.
But no current issues are likely to provoke that degree of passion,
and in any event the Justices have become far too canny to blunder
that badly. It is no accident that Romer v. Evans3 5 was handed
down the same day as BMW v. Gore 36-- the Justices are now more
careful about appeasing constituencies and generating allies across
the political spectrum.
If the normative analysis ofjudicial review is as opaque as I have
portrayed it, however, we should also be wary of overconfidence in
our ability to predict its staying power as a positive matter. That
was a major lesson of the collapse of Soviet communism: Large-
scale institutional changes often happen so quickly and un-
expectedly that learned professors usually deny the possibility up
to the very moment that the change occurs. The legacy of judicial
review is secure for now, but I reserve the right to say that I
31. Black & White Taxi Cab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1928).
32. Erie, 304 U.S. at 73-77 (describing defects of the Swift doctrine and noting the
widespread criticism of the doctrine following the Court's decision in Black & White Taxi).
33. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding that slaves are not U.S.
citizens), superseded by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
34. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (construing the Tenth Amendment narrowly and limiting
Congress' Commerce Clause power), overruled inpart by U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
35. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down state constitutional classification based on
homosexuality).
36. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding "grossly excessive"
punitive damages a Due Process Clause violation).
[Vol. 43:15571566
2002] THE DILEMMA OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 1567
predicted its demise, if only in this very contingent and qualified
sense.
